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For two reasons, the conventional wisdom is that the poor are
not heavy users of the insolvency system. First, creditors are
reluctant to extend credit to the poor because the risks of nonpayment are high. Not having been able to borrow, the poor are
not over-indebted and are therefore not in need of bankruptcy
protection. Second, some poor debtors—lone parents on social
assistance for example—are "judgment-proof" meaning that
judgments for money recoveries obtained by their creditors are
of no effect because these debtors do not have sufficient nonexempt property or income to satisfy the judgment.
Developments in two areas may challenge the conventional
view. Undoubtedly, credit is now widely available across the
spectrum of income groups. Even a short-term, low-wage job can
bring a credit card to the doorstep of the poor and the slogan "no
credit, no problem" testifies to the availability of retail credit. In
addition, we now know that poverty is often a temporary state
for many Canadians, with many moving in and out of lowincome. Accordingly, the "judgment-proof" state is not a
permanent condition, but a temporary status for many. While
this may be welcome news in some respects, it means that debts
can be accumulated during periods of relative economic wellbeing only to go unpaid when a job ends or when hard times
return. These developments suggest the possibility that some of
those who are poor at any point in time are in fact in need of
bankruptcy protection. They have debts that they are unable to
pay and little likelihood of being able to repay in the near future.
We begin the paper by presenting evidence from the 1999 Survey
of Financial Security on indebtedness among families in the
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lower income deciles. We then turn to the main question:
should the Canadian bankruptcy process be more readily
available to poor debtors. We draw on two sources to shed light
on this question: a) a comparative analysis (considering England
and Wales, the United States, Australia and New Zealand) and b)
a series of semi-structured interviews with Canadian bankruptcy
trustees and other insolvency professionals.
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BANKRUPTCY FOR THE POOR?
Stephanie Ben-Ishai∗ and Saul Schwartz**

I. INTRODUCTION
Should the bankruptcy process be more readily available to poor
Canadians? Several different jurisdictions have recognized that
it can be difficult for poor debtors to file for bankruptcy due to
the associated out-of-pocket costs and have identified forms of
relief that can assist them in obtaining a fresh start. This paper
addresses the question of whether Canadian debtors who cannot
afford to pay the normal fees charged by bankruptcy trustees
should have low-cost access to bankruptcy through a
mechanism other than the summary administration procedure.
We draw on two sources to shed light on this question: (1) a
comparative analysis of different approaches adopted in the
United States, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands; and (2) our findings from a series of semistructured interviews with bankruptcy trustees. Bankruptcy
trustees in Canada are the private intermediaries (often
accountants) who are regulated and licensed by the Office of the
Superintendent in Bankruptcy (OSB) and serve as gatekeepers to
the consumer bankruptcy process.
The research question under consideration goes to the heart of
the long-standing debate about the ease with which debtors
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should be able to obtain a full discharge of their debts through
the bankruptcy process. On one side of the debate are those who
believe that the vast majority of debtors filing bankruptcy are
honest but unfortunate and seek relief from their debts only as a
distasteful last resort. Those on the other side of the debate
believe that many who file for bankruptcy could repay their
debts if only they were more diligent in their work habits and
more careful in their spending habits. These two views lead to
different conclusions about any initiative that makes
bankruptcy more accessible. Those adhering to the first view
believe that greater accessibility will not dramatically increase
the numbers of debtors who file for bankruptcy since
bankruptcy is sought only as a last resort. Those who hold to the
second view believe that the barriers to bankruptcy, both
monetary and non-monetary, must be kept high in order to
discourage large numbers of debtors from seeking bankruptcy.
As demonstrated through our interviews with a number of
bankruptcy trustees, this general debate spills over into the
narrower debate about the subset of debtors who have so little
income that they cannot pay a trustee’s normal fees, even if
those fees can be paid over the nine months of a typical
summary administration.
A key issue for this paper is defining what we mean by “poor
debtors.” All debtors filing for bankruptcy attest to the fact that
they are insolvent, unable to make debt payments as they come
due. In that sense, all bankrupts are poor. However, most of
those filing for bankruptcy have sufficient income to make
relatively small monthly payments to the trustee, drawing
either upon their earnings or upon friends and family. We are
interested here in the much smaller group of debtors whom the
trustee has deemed as lacking the funds to pay the normal fees.
In such cases, the trustee must decide whether to accept lowerthan-normal fees or to turn the debtor away.
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We asked each of the trustees that we interviewed to
characterize such debtors and found that they shared a common
vision. As one trustee put it: “These are people who live a
marginal existence, on social assistance, living in governmentsubsidized housing and with no prospects for changing this
around.”1 That same trustee stated that such debtors have “no
income, no friends, no family” and are “by themselves and at
the end of their rope.” Others spoke of debtors with physical or
2
cognitive disabilities or of lone mothers who are immigrants
with limited ability to speak English or French.3 Women seem to
figure prominently among poor debtors, most likely reflecting
the feminization of poverty that has occurred in recent decades.
In our view, the key element of this characterization is the
strong likelihood that these debtors will experience persistent
poverty, with or without their debts. They are not using the
bankruptcy system to discharge their debts with the goal of
moving on to a comfortable middle-class existence. We concur
with the views of the trustees and henceforth will use the term
“poor debtors” to refer to debtors seeking bankruptcy who
cannot pay the trustee’s normal fees and who seem unlikely to
attain anything but a low income for the foreseeable future.
The existence of poor debtors has long been known. The
unresolved question is whether there are large numbers of
debtors who are unable to go through the bankruptcy process
because they are unable to pay the trustee’s fees. The trustees
with whom we spoke were unanimous in their opinion that the
number of poor debtors who were unable to file for bankruptcy
4
was quite small. The reason, in their view, is that they were
themselves willing to handle the file of any debtor who appeared

1

Interview with Trustee 4, 15 September 2006.
Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006.
3
Interview with Trustee 1, 18 August 2006.
4
Trustees 2, 3, 5, and 6.
2
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before them and that they felt that debtors in other places would
be able to find a trustee to take their case.
The trustees we interviewed recognized that poor debtors are
usually judgement proof and face no real prospect that a court
would allow their creditors to take any action against them.
Each trustee said that they informed debtors of what it meant to
be judgement proof, explaining that the debtors could stop
collection efforts by telling the collection agencies of their
inability to pay. However, the trustees did not equate
“judgement proof” with “not in need of bankruptcy.”
As one trustee put it, “creditors are very aggressive and they [the
debtors] reach a breaking point. I always tell them they are
judgement proof but this doesn’t help them in dealing with
creditors on a day-to-day basis.”5 Another trustee stated that
even though he always informs poor debtors that they are
judgement proof, debtors often have an emotional need to be
debt-free; he gave an example of handling the bankruptcy of
someone on their deathbed, a debtor who wanted to die debt6
free. The trustees interviewed expressed a surprising lack of
concern with administering bankruptcies for debtors who were
clearly judgement proof. Even if these debtors are judgement
proof, the trustees believe they require protection from overlyenthusiastic collection efforts; debtors “believe creditors when
they say they are going to do something” and “just not
answering the phone can be difficult and they may not have the
7
money to change the telephone number.” Some expressed
sympathy towards debtors who not only face harassing

5

Interview with Trustee 8, 8 September 2006.
Ibid.
7
Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006. That same trustee noted that
many people now have only a cell phone and pay for minutes even when
someone calls them. Calls from collection agencies can therefore be
expensive for the debtor.
6
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collection efforts, but also hear misrepresentations of what
might happen if they fail to make payments.
The debtors that these trustees have in mind should be
distinguished from so-called no-income, no-asset (NINA)
8
debtors. In the Canadian context, NINA debtors have no nonexempt assets to liquidate and no income above the OSB’s
Surplus Income Guidelines. In such cases, there is only a small
prospect of a significant dividend for creditors. Estimates suggest
that 70 to 80 per cent of bankruptcies in Canada are filed by
NINA debtors. Most of these debtors, however, are able to pay
the normal trustee fees, spread out over the nine months of the
summary administration. They are poor, but the depth of their
poverty is far less than that of the debtors described above.
As background, a short summary of the operation of the OSB’s
Surplus Income Guidelines is in order. Debtors who have
income above the OSB’s Surplus Income thresholds must make
contributions to the estate during the bankruptcy period. For
example, a bankrupt in a family unit of 2 with $2800 of
available monthly income would be required to pay $181 per
month in Surplus Income Payments until they are discharged
from bankruptcy. The Surplus Income thresholds are based on
the Low Income Cut-Offs (LICO) published by Statistics Canada.
Any analysis of Surplus Income payments requires an analysis of
the Statement of Receipts and Disbursements (SRD) which
shows the receipts coming into each estate and the payments
(including trustee fees and creditor dividends). From January 1,
2006 to December 31, 2006, the SRD was electronically-

8

In the deliberations of the OSB’s Personal Insolvency Task Force some five
years ago, there was substantial discussion of the idea of creating a new and
simpler insolvency procedure for NINA debtors. In the end, it was decided
that a streamlined version of the existing summary administration procedure
would adequately address the issue.
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submitted for 29,379 summary administration bankruptcies (see
Appendix C for a description of these data). In roughly 20
percent of these files (5,739/29279), the debtor was required to
make payments from their Surplus Income under Section 168 of
the BIA; in the other 80 percent, no requirement to make
Surplus Income payments was imposed. Of the 5,739 cases
required to make Surplus Income payments, 63 percent
(3,635/5,739) paid a creditor dividend and 37 percent did not. For
the 3,635 cases that paid a dividend, the average dividend paid
was $1,982 (with a standard deviation of $3,964). For the 23,640
estates without a Surplus Income requirement, 28 percent paid a
dividend and 72 percent did not; the mean dividend among those
who paid a dividend was $1,106 with a standard deviation of
$2,261.9
To summarize, the trustees interviewed held a common
conception of the characteristics of the debtor who could not
afford to pay trustees’ fees. Even though the typical such debtor
is judgement proof, the trustees still felt that they deserved the
right to file for bankruptcy. Moreover, we should be careful not
to confuse the relatively small number of poor debtors currently
seeking bankruptcy with the very large number of debtors who
have no non-exempt assets and no income above the OSB’s
Surplus Income Guidelines.

9

Calculations by the Business Intelligence Centre of the Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy. See also Appendix C.
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II. DO THE POOR NEED BANKRUPTCY?
The poor in the context of consumer bankruptcy are not only
insolvent at the time of filing for bankruptcy, but are likely to
have been poor for some time and are likely to remain in
poverty for the foreseeable future. Their current earnings
prospects are dim and their life circumstances are such that any
upward economic mobility will be impeded by significant
barriers.
However, for one of two reasons, some might question whether
the poor need bankruptcy. The first reason has already been
discussed. Many of the poor are judgement proof and, in
principle, can simply refuse to respond to collection efforts.
Nonetheless, that seemingly simple refusal is far more difficult
than one might think and judgement proof debtors frequently
appear in trustees’ offices seeking bankruptcy protection.
The second reason for believing that the poor do not need
bankruptcy is the idea that the poor do not accumulate very
large debts and therefore have little need for bankruptcy
protection. In this section, we use the 1999 Survey of Financial
Security to illustrate that the so-called “democratization of
credit”—the extension of credit throughout the income
distribution—has proceeded to the point where even families in
the lowest deciles of family income have significant debts.
Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of various kinds of debt
across the deciles of family income. Families in the bottom
three deciles almost certainly have incomes that are less than
the relevant Statistics Canada Low Income Cut-Off (LICO) and
therefore might qualify as poor by our definition.10

10

There is, however, an important difference between the poor families in
Tables 1 and 2 and poor families as we think of them in the context of
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Table 1 makes clear that significant proportions of the poor have
debts in each of the categories listed. To be sure, families in the
lowest three deciles are less likely to have various types of debts
than those in the higher deciles, but one in four has credit card
debt and one in six hold other debts. Since bankruptcy is a
situation facing only a minority of debtors, these proportions are
large enough to suggest that a significant minority of poor
families will have significant debts coming due at a time when
their income is low. The amounts shown in Table 2 are averages
only for those who have positive amounts of debt in each
category, but their size once again suggests that poor families
may acquire significant debts, especially in relation to their low
income.
We note in passing that student loan debts are an important type
of debt held by the poor, both in terms of frequency and size,
and student loans are not dischargeable through bankruptcy. We
see that the families in the lowest decile are the most likely to
hold student loans, partly because those loans are directed to
students from low-income families and partly because there is a
correlation between the incomes of parents and children. If the
debts of a poor family become overwhelming, it may make sense
to file for bankruptcy in order to discharge the debts that are
dischargeable and to then focus on repaying the student loans
that are not dischargeable.

bankruptcy. In our conception, poor families seeking bankruptcy protection
are not only poor at a single point in time but are likely to remain poor for
the foreseeable future. Because there is considerable mobility in and out of
poverty in Canada, a significant minority of families in the lowest deciles of
family income in Tables 1 and 2 are likely to move out of poverty in future
years.
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Table 1: Proportion of Families with Various Types of Debt
Deciles of Family
Income

Mortgage

Vehicle
Loans

Credit
Cards

Student
Loans

Other
Debts

Total
Debt

Less than $12,250
12,250-18,000

0.07
0.09

0.06
0.09

0.25
0.24

0.13
0.09

0.17
0.15

0.50
0.47

18,000-24,700
0.14
0.14
0.32
0.10
0.20
0.57
24,700-31,850
0.22
0.19
0.39
0.10
0.24
0.65
31,850-40,000
0.32
0.24
0.42
0.12
0.27
0.72
40,000-49,000
0.41
0.28
0.46
0.10
0.32
0.78
49,000-60,850
0.45
0.31
0.47
0.11
0.35
0.81
60,850-76,800
0.53
0.34
0.48
0.12
0.40
0.84
76,800-105,300
0.52
0.34
0.45
0.10
0.39
0.83
More than 105,300
0.47
0.23
0.30
0.05
0.39
0.76
Source: 1999 Survey of Financial Security (unweighted). See Schwartz, S. and S. Baum, "How
Much Debt is Too Much? Benchmarks for Manageable Debt in Canada and the United States" in
Bruce Doern and Christopher Stoney, eds. Universities and the Powering of Knowledge: Policy,
Regulation and Innovation (University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2007), Chapter 7. Note: All
debts are reported for the family as a whole.

Table 2: Amount of Debt Outstanding for Families with Non-negative Debt
Deciles of Family
Income

Mortgage

Vehicle
Loans

Credit
Cards

Student
Loans

Other
Debts

Total Debt

Less than $12,250
$62,260
$6,968
$2,064
$11,961
$6,562
$19,430
12,250-18,000
52,348
8,338
1,957
12,013
8,601
19,875
18,000-24,700
51,815
8,113
2,233
9,983
6,307
23,651
24,700-31,850
51,783
9,393
2,551
11,593
8,171
29,248
31,850-40,000
58,804
9,835
2,696
10,611
9,021
39,202
40,000-49,000
65,158
10,897
2,998
10,093
9,126
48,871
49,000-60,850
70,281
11,005
3,186
9,619
11,740
58,561
60,850-76,800
75,093
12,054
3,479
9,979
14,589
69,382
76,800-105,300
80.899
14,469
3,786
9,769
17,632
77,080
More than 105,300
117,558
16,108
4,721
12,354
33,266
109,512
No. of Families
5,098
3,506
5,993
1,615
4,592
10,543
Source: 1999 Survey of Financial Security (unweighted). See Schwartz, S. and S. Baum, "How Much
Debt is Too Much? Benchmarks for Manageable Debt in Canada and the United States" in Bruce
Doern and Christopher Stoney, eds. Universities and the Powering of Knowledge: Policy, Regulation
and Innovation (University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2007), Chapter 7. Note: All debts are
reported for the family as a whole.
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM
One option facing poor but heavily indebted Canadians is to do
nothing. Whatever threats might be made by collectors and
regardless of the persistence of their calls and visits, such
individuals are likely to be judgement proof and the threats and
calls will eventually stop. “Doing nothing”, however, when
faced with persistent and threatening collection calls is easier
said than done. Few know the law well enough to know that the
threats are empty and that the calls will stop sooner rather than
later. For those who seek to resolve their debt situations,
bankruptcy can be the best option. The other major option—
credit counselling as currently practiced in Canada—is unlikely
to be successful because poor debtors often lack the financial
resources to make the payments required by a debt management
plan.
The premise of this paper is that there may be debtors in need of
bankruptcy who cannot afford the fees that trustees ask. As
background, a short summary of the rules that govern the feesetting behaviour of trustees is in order. Rule 128(1) of the BIA
sets out the method in which maximum fees are to be
11
calculated. Essentially, these maximum fees are a function of
the amount of receipts coming into the estate. The fee schedule
sets out the maximum fees that a trustee can collect (the first
$975, plus 35 percent of the next $1,025, plus 50 percent of
everything above $2,000 to a maximum of $10,000). In practice,
it seems that trustees try to realize at least $1,500 to $1,700 on
each file. Of course, they are free to take less if they so choose.
At the onset of a bankruptcy, the level of receipts is generally
unknown since it will depend on the amount the trustee earns
for the estate by selling the debtor’s assets and on the refunds, if

11

See Appendix B.
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any, from the trustee’s filing of the debtor’s tax returns. In
deciding whether or not to accept the case, trustees must decide
if they are likely to be paid for their efforts. In many cases,
debtors have no non-exempt assets and the amounts that can be
expected from the debtors’ tax returns are not enough to bring
the receipts of the estate up to an acceptable level. In such cases,
trustees are allowed to ask the debtors to make payments to the
estate, over the course of the nine months of the bankruptcy. In
a significant minority of bankruptcies, these voluntary
payments comprise the bulk of the receipts of the estate.12
The problem for the poor debtors is that trustees may decide,
rightly or wrongly, that the receipts of the estate, including any
voluntary payments that the debtor can afford, are not likely to
reach an acceptable level. If so, the trustee need not accept the
case.
In talking to the trustees, we realized that a poor debtor who
decides to seek bankruptcy in Canada and cannot afford to make
the voluntary payments required by most trustees has two
options. First, the debtors may try to find a trustee who will

12

For summary administration bankruptcies with SRDs electronicallysubmitted between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2006, the proportion of
receipts consisting of voluntary payments by the debtor can be estimated (see
Appendix C). Voluntary payments were made in 77 percent of the cases.
Voluntary payments made up more than 50 percent of the receipts in 49
percent of the cases and were more than 75 percent of the receipts of the
estate in 25 percent. A controversial issue here is that the voluntary
payments that trustees are allowed to ask of debtors become part of the estate
and cannot be returned to the debtor should actual receipts turn out to be
unexpectedly large. If trustees expect that receipts from the sale of nonexempt assets or from tax refunds will cover trustees’ usual fees, they will
presumably lower or eliminate the voluntary payments. The only mechanism
driving trustees to lower their fees in such cases, however, is potential
competition from other trustees.
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handle the file at a lower-than-normal price. Second, the debtors
might seek help from the Bankruptcy Assistance Program (BAP)
operated by the OSB.

A. RELYING ON AREA TRUSTEES
Conceivably, debtors who seek help from trustees in their area
might be turned away by all of them. None of the trustees that
we interviewed, however, believed that large numbers of poor
debtors were in fact being turned away due to their inability to
pay trustees’ fees. Even if some area firms were unwilling to
accept the files, the trustees thought that poor debtors would be
able to find at least one trustee who would be flexible in the fees
that he or she asked. The majority of the trustees we
interviewed indicated that they themselves would never turn
away a debtor seeking bankruptcy if they thought that the only
obstacle to bankruptcy was the level of their fees. Most would
agree with one trustee’s statement that she “would never refuse
someone who cannot afford the fee.”13 However, the decision to
be flexible on fees is not automatic; the trustees described the
decision as one made on a case-by-case, dependent upon the
information gleaned during their initial interviews with the
debtor.
The trustees were willing to go beyond their own personal
experience to suggest that such flexibility is quite common
among trustees. While this flexibility may be common, it may
not be universal. One trustee said that the national firms in her
location did not lower their fees if the debtor could not pay.14
Another trustee (from a national firm) said that firms that were
busy were unlikely to be flexible in their fees.15

13

Interview with Trustee 1, 18 August 2006.
Interview with Trustee 2, 8 September 2006.
15
Interview with Trustee 9, 29 November 2006.
14
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In some cities, area trustees have gotten together and decided to
handle the cases of poor debtors according to an agreed-upon
formula. Such voluntary plans are not new. In 1969, the Globe
and Mail reported that “a newly formed group of Ontario
bankruptcy trustees has agreed to negotiate a plan for reducedcost service to debtors who cannot afford the usual $500 fee for
personal bankrupts.”16 The plan was aimed at “the honest debtor
who deserves the benefit of the bankruptcy but can’t finance it
17
himself.”
In 1994, trustees in the Halifax region agreed that, as a group,
they would handle the bankruptcies of anyone who needed the
service and could not afford it.18 That agreement has persisted
over time and today poor debtors are asked to pay only $250.19
Similarly, trustees in Edmonton agreed in 1999 to a similar
arrangement for dealing with what are now known as “450
cases” because the out-of-pocket costs (and therefore the fee
20
charged) at that time amounted to $450.
Apart from the reports of trustees, however, there is no way to
determine precisely how many debtors are simply turned away,
who do not approach trustees because they think they will be

16

Loren Lind, “New service offered to lower costs of bankruptcy” Globe and
Mail (6 February 1969) 35. It is important to note that in that era the
summary tariff was a flat $450 fee plus $50 for disbursements. This was the
maximum fee possible for such files regardless of the amount of work
performed. At that time the vast majority of trustees required that the $500
had to be paid up front before the bankruptcy would be filed. Email from
Dave Stewart, Deputy Superintendent of Bankruptcy, 24 October 2006.
17

Ibid.
Interview with Trustee 6, 20 September 2006.
19
The fee is still $250 in Halifax even though out-of-pocket costs are now
higher. Ibid.
20
Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006.
18
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unable to afford the normal fees or who cannot afford upfront
21
payments of $250-$450.

B. THE BANKRUPTCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
The OSB administers a little-used program called the
22
Bankruptcy Assistance Program (BAP). Trustees must agree to
be part of the program and those who do so are placed on a list of
available trustees. The program then assigns listed trustees to
administer the files of debtors who have approached at least two
trustees to handle their bankruptcies but who have been turned
away because of their inability to pay the normal fees.
Very few cases are actually filed under the BAP program. Of the
29,379 summary administration cases with electronicallysubmitted SRDs received between January 1 and December 31
2006, only 304 were BAP cases.23 Our interviews illustrate,
however, that it would be a mistake to assume that the number
of poor debtors is equal to the number of BAP cases. For
example, in the cities where an agreement exists among trustees
to handle poor debtors in a certain way, trustees will often not
refer poor debtors to the BAP program, but will simply
administer the cases themselves. Perhaps a better measure of the
number of poor debtors is the number of cases in which receipts
are less than $500; of the above-mentioned 29,075 non-BAP

21

We note that this is a common situation in evaluating program
participation; since information on non-participants is rarely collected, there
is no effective way to estimate their number apart from anecdotal evidence
from practitioners.
22
The statutory source for the BAP is a directive known as "Directive No.11"
made pursuant to the BIA. Section 5(4)(b) to (e) of the BIA provides the OSB
with the power to make directives. Directive No. 11 was first issued on
October 23, 1986. See: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inbsfosb.nsf/en/br01331e.html for the actual directive.
23
Calculations by the Business Intelligence Centre of the Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy. See also Appendix C.
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summary administration bankruptcies, receipts were less than
24
$500 in 1,056 of the files.
There is no set fee charged by trustees for BAP cases. As in all
summary administration cases, the trustee collects GST refunds
and any tax refund arising from the pre-bankruptcy tax return.
For poor debtors, these sources might yield only a small amount
of money. In such cases, most of the trustees that we
interviewed ask that the debtor pay for the $75 filing fee and the
$180 cost of the two counselling sessions up front, allowing the
debtor to pay off any remaining voluntary payments that may be
required by the trustee with small payments over the nine
months of the bankruptcy.
One trustee told us, however, that BAP cases in her area were
often almost as remunerative as non-BAP cases, with the trustee
realizing fees close to the usual amount charged.25 The
Edmonton trustee that we interviewed stated that the GST
refunds usually cover the out-of-pocket costs and that she had
only lost money on two of the “450 cases” that she has handled
since 1999.26 Another trustee informed us that he averages
$1,000 to $1,200 on a BAP case as opposed to the $1,200 to
$1,500 that he charges for a typical summary administration.27
Looking at the receipts and disbursements for the 304 BAP cases
with SRDs electronically-submitted in calendar 2006, we see
that the average trustee fee in these cases was $1,500 with a
standard deviation of $986. This mean seemed surprisingly high
and we thought it might be influenced by a handful of cases in
which the receipts of the estate (and thus the trustee’s fee) were

24

The number of cases with receipts less than $500 is not necessarily the
number of cases filed by poor debtors. As we will see later in the paper, many
BAP cases have receipts greater than $500.
25
Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006.
26
Ibid.
27
Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006.
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inflated by unusual circumstances. For example, one BAP debtor
received a $39,000 inheritance during his bankruptcy. However,
the median trustee fee is $1,594 suggesting that the few cases
with large receipts were not the main factor underlying the high
mean. Voluntary payments from the debtors were not common;
such payments were made in only 61 of the 304 cases.
Even though the average fees on BAP cases seem high to us, one
trustee felt that there was no unmet need for bankruptcy in his
area. He thought that all those who sought help in his area were
being served and, furthermore, extensive advertising by trustees
meant that no needy debtors were unaware of the option of
28
filing. Another trustee observed that because the ability of
trustees to oppose the bankrupt’s discharge for unpaid fees
provided security that their fees would be paid few debtors were
turned way. The same trustee, however, also observed that the
costs of attending at court for the discharge hearing might be
excessive for a trustee operating on his or her own.29

C. DISCUSSION
We believe that the lack of uniform treatment of poor debtors is
a major impediment to equal access to bankruptcy. In effect,
their bankruptcies are handled in a way similar to how paupers
received aid before the advent of modern social assistance
systems, when local charities, local churches, or municipal
governments took up the task of providing for the destitute. As a
result, the nature of the assistance that the poor received varied
widely across Canada. Some received the assistance that they
required, while others did not. Similarly, some poor debtors
have low-cost access to bankruptcy; others do not.

28
29

Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006.
Interview with Trustee 9, 29 November 2006.
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A broad assessment of the situation suggests that most of those who
seek bankruptcy are able to file. The cost of filing varies across the
country, however, so the extent to which low-cost access is
available is unknown.
Debtors who cannot afford to pay trustee fees can use the BAP
program, but few do. Instead, some individual trustees and groups of
trustees take it upon themselves to provide service to poor debtors.
The Halifax and Edmonton agreements discussed above are
examples of collective action of the sort that local charities might
have undertaken to help the poor in the nineteenth century.
th
While the analogy to 19 century social assistance is apt in some
ways, it is less appropriate in others. For trustees specializing in
consumer bankruptcies, fee flexibility is sometimes a good business
decision rather than pro bono work. Most small businesses need to
maintain a steady volume of cases in order to keep the staff busy.
During periods when full-price cases are scarce, servicing poor
debtors “keeps the lights on” even if the profit on such cases may
turn out to be low or non-existent.30 The idea is that “anything is a
contribution to overhead.”31 The marginal cost of such cases is very
small since the staff is already on site and may be underemployed
during slow periods. The files of poor debtors may therefore have a
positive effect on the economic viability of trustees’ businesses,
helping them cover overhead during slow periods. Two of the
interviewed trustees even thought that removing the files of poor
debtors might endanger the economic viability of trustees who
32
specialize in consumer bankruptcy. The trustee from the large firm
also noted this phenomenon when he said that he did not have to
worry about cash flow and therefore did not need to take on the files
of poor debtors for that reason.

30

Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006.
Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006.
32
Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006; Interview with Trustee 6, 20
September 2006.
31
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IV. SHOULD POOR DEBTORS HAVE FINANCIALLY
ACCESSIBLE OPTIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY?
A. THE AMERICAN IN FORMA PAUPERIS EXPERIENCE
The American academic literature has tackled the issue of
whether poor debtors should be allowed to file in forma pauperis
petitions in bankruptcy. In the United States, the authority to
proceed in forma pauperis is granted by statute, and is meant to
provide indigent litigants with meaningful access to the federal
courts, equivalent to the access available to those who can
afford to pay.33 When an individual successfully petitions to
proceed in forma pauperis, certain costs and fees are waived.34
Those who argue against allowing in forma pauperis proceedings
in bankruptcy stress the cost implications of waiving fees: the
amount of fees collected by the system would decrease.35
Furthermore, critics assert, nearly everyone who files for
bankruptcy relief will ask that fees be waived, and therefore
screening mechanisms will have to be introduced adding time
and expense.36 Opponents suggest that a fee waiver system
would encourage unnecessary and improper bankruptcy cases:37
individuals would file for bankruptcy even when there is no
benefit in doing so—because debtors who cannot afford the
filing fee are typically judgement proof.38 Such a system may

33

Michael E. Markham & Bethann Scharrer, “In Forma Pauperis: An
Unnecessary Privilege in Bankruptcy” (1994) 73 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 73
at 77.
34
Ibid. at 78. In the United States, some costs and fees are not waived. For
example, witness fees and expenses are not among the fees and costs waived.
35
Ibid. at 90.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., Implementing and Evaluating the Chapter 7
Filing Fee Waiver Program (Federal Judicial Center, 1998), online:
<http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc_catalog.nsf/autoframepage!openform&url=/li
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also be subject to abuse or fraud: critics argue, for example, that
a fee waiver system will increase the number of people who file
to benefit from an automatic stay, with no intention of
39
following through to a discharge.
In the American context, some commentators assert that a fee
waiver system is unnecessary because the filing fees can be paid
in installments, and as such access to the system is denied only
in rare circumstances.40 Otis B. Grant argues that the filing fee
must be retained because of the easy availability of discharge: if
a debtor believes that discharge is costless, Grant asserts, he or
she will be more likely to use it.41 Bankruptcy must have a cost,
he states, because otherwise creditors will shift the cost of
bankruptcy to the buyers of goods.42 Lastly, Michael Markham
and Bethann Scharrer argue that proceeding in a bankruptcy case
is “nothing more than a privilege,” and thus “it seems logical
that proceeding in forma pauperis in bankruptcy is also only a
43
privilege.”
Harry Sommer succinctly states the argument in favour of being
able to proceed forma pauperis in bankruptcy filings: “Equal
justice under the law.”44 His response to the argument that the
filing fee is low enough, and can be paid in installments, is that
“…those who make [the argument] must be shockingly

brary/fjc_catalog.nsf/Publication!openform&parentunid=76FF032DF9BA521B
85256CA300688AE3 >at 21.
39
Ibid. at 22.
40
Ibid. at 22.
41
Otis B. Grant, “Are the Indigent Too Poor for Bankruptcy? A Critical Legal
Interpretation of the Theory of Fresh Start within a Law and Economics
Paradigm” (2002) 33 Univ. Toledo L. Rev. 773 at 792.
42
Ibid. at 793.
43
Markham & Scharrer, supra note 32 at 83.
44
Harry Sommer, “In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: The Time has Long
since Come” (1994) 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 93 at 97.
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unfamiliar with the plight of those in poverty in this country.”45
Sommer notes that people file for bankruptcy for other reasons
than to protect assets: to prevent a utility shutoff, to protect a
driver’s licence, to participate in a government program, to
prevent garnishment of wages (which is allowed in some states),
or to fend off harassing or abusive calls from creditors/collection
agencies.46 He considers the fears of overburdening the court
system with more paperwork to be overstated,47 and argues that
the solution to abuse is not to restrict access to the system but
to address problem directly: the possibility that some might
48
abuse the system is not a reason to reject a proposed reform.

V. MODELS FOR REFORM
A number of jurisdictions have followed on concerns such as
those expressed by Sommer, recognized that it can be difficult
for poor debtors to file for bankruptcy due to the associated
costs, and have identified forms of relief that assist poor debtors
in obtaining a fresh start. The following section documents the
available and proposed bankruptcy services for the poor across
the United States, Australia, New Zealand, England and Wales,
and the Netherlands.

45

Ibid. at 100. Notice that Sommer’s statements reflect the findings on the
need for bankruptcy for the poor from our interviews of Canadian bankruptcy
trustees.
46
Ibid. at 103-104. See also Susan D. Kovac, “Judgement-Proof Debtors in
Bankruptcy” (1991) 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 675 at 678-681 for a discussion of the
benefits and costs of bankruptcy for judgement-proof debtors; and Nathaniel
C. Nichols, “The Poor Need Not Apply: Moralistic Barriers to Bankruptcy’s
Fresh Start (1993-1994) 25 Rutgers L.J. 329 at 351-353, where he points out
that filing for bankruptcy is an effective way for a poor family to prevent the
stoppage of a utility service, while providing for a fresh beginning with the
utility service.
47
Sommer, supra note 43 at 105.
48
Ibid. at 107.
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A. UNITED STATES
Title 28 of the United States Code represents the American in
forma pauperis statute, allowing an individual to file civil
actions in federal courts without paying the requisite filing fee.49
A person seeking to proceed in forma pauperis must file an
affidavit showing an inability to pay the associated costs.50
Section 1930 governs the payment of fees in bankruptcy courts.
As the statute was previously worded, bankruptcy courts did not
fall under the definition of a “court of the United States”, and
therefore had no authority to allow in forma pauperis
proceedings.51 A 1973 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court held
that there was no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of
one’s debts in bankruptcy, concluding that the fee provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code at the time were not an unconstitutional
denial of due process rights.52 Thus, the legislation and
jurisprudence previously precluded the application of Title 28 to
the initial filing fee for a bankruptcy petition.53
Under section 418 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (and codified at Title 28 of the
United States Code), however, individual Chapter 7 filers may
now file an application to waive the filing fee at the same time
as they file the bankruptcy petition.54 Under the new legislation,
a district or bankruptcy court may waive the filing fee for an
individual debtor who (a) has income less than 150 per cent of
the poverty guidelines last established by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services; and (b) is unable to pay that fee

49

Markham & Scharrer, supra note 32 at 73.
Ibid. at 77.
51
See ibid. at 80 for an overview of the decisions which have held that
bankruptcy courts are not courts of the United States.
52
Ibid. at 74-75; see United States v. Kras 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
53
Sommer, supra note 43 at 95.
54
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, s.
418, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1-3).
50
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in installments.55 For individual debtors whose filing fees have
been waived, the bankruptcy or district court may also waive
56
other fees. The Code also allows for the payment of the filing
fee in installments.57
Congress implemented a pilot program in 1994 in six judicial
districts to study the effect of waiving the $175 filing fee for
individual Chapter 7 debtors who were unable to pay the fee in
installments.58 The study found that an application for waiver of
the filing fee was filed in 3.4 per cent of all non-business
Chapter 7 cases, and granted in 2.9 per cent of the cases.59 The
report concluded that the fee-waiver program may make the
bankruptcy system more accessible to low-income debtors:
almost 11 per cent of the successful fee-waiver applicants stated
that they would not have filed for bankruptcy had there been no
fee-waiver program.60 In particular, the committee concluded
that the program may have enhanced access to the bankruptcy
system for indigent single women.61 Debtors whose filing fees
were waived were more likely to obtain a discharge compared to
62
debtors whose applications were denied. The report noted that

55

“Judicial Conference of the United States Interim Procedures Regarding the
Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005” (11 August 2005), online: U.S. Courts
<http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/jcusguidelines.html>.
56
28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(2). The fees that may be waived are those prescribed
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1930(b) and (c).
57
Bankruptcy Rule 1006; 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a). Upon petition, the court may
grant leave to pay in installments. The number of installments shall not
exceed four, and the final installment shall be payable not later than 120 days
after filing the petition. For cause shown, the court may extend the time of
any installment, provided the last installment is paid not later than 180 days
after filing the petition.
58
See Wiggins et al., supra note 37.
59
Ibid. at 1.
60
Ibid. at 4.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
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there was an increase overall in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings
during the period of study, complicating the assessment of
whether the program increased Chapter 7 filings. The study
concluded, however, that only a “small fraction” of the
63
Assuming
increased filings were due to the program.
applications would be filed and granted at the same rate as
occurred in the pilot program, the study predicted that a
national fee-waiver program would cost approximately $4.7
million in lost filing fees, $74,000 in waived miscellaneous fees
for in forma pauperis debtors, and $1.5 million in salary for
additional office clerk personnel (a total cost of approximately
64
$6.3 million). To fund the program, the study recommended
that Congress increase the judiciary’s appropriation by this
amount,65 or request authorization for application of the U.S.
Treasury share of the filing fee to cover the cost.66
In addition to filing fees, U.S. debtors often are confronted with
legal fees as they navigate the complex bankruptcy process. As
one commentator notes, it is unlikely that a no-asset Chapter 7
filer can afford to pay a bankruptcy attorney up front.67 Without
a retainer, a bankruptcy attorney is unlikely to pay the requisite
filing fees or perform other pre-petition services because the
debtor’s obligation to pay for these services are likely to be
discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.68 Most courts have
held that pre-petition attorney fees are dischargeable, forcing

63

Ibid. at 6.
Ibid. at 12. The study did indicate that the cost might rise significantly if
fee waivers were automatically based on a bright-line income standard.
65
This represented 2/10 of one per cent of the judiciary’s total fiscal
appropriation for 1997: ibid. at 13.
66
Ibid.
67
Kerry Heydel Ducey, “Bankruptcy, just for the Rich? an Analysis of Popular
Fee Arrangements for Pre-Petition Legal Fees and a Call to Amend” (2001) 54
Vand. L. Rev. 1665 at 1667.
68
Ibid.
64
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bankruptcy attorneys to “get creative” if they wish to get paid.69
Kerry Haydel Ducey recommends exempting pre-petition
bankruptcy attorney fees from discharge, which would in turn
encourage counsel to represent “even the poorest of debtors” by
removing the risks of representing those who may be unable to
pay their legal fees in advance.70 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),
the court may request an attorney to represent someone who is
unable to afford counsel, although most bankruptcy judges have
71
decided that they do not have the authority to do so.

B. AUSTRALIA
The vast majority of bankruptcies in Australia are administered
by Official Receivers, although bankruptcies may be
administered by trustees from either the public or private
sector.72 Australia’s bankruptcy regime provides 3 alternative
bankruptcy options, two of which are low-cost options. First,
under s. 55 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, a debtor may apply for
bankruptcy without the need for court involvement. A debtor
may become bankrupt by presenting a petition and statement of
financial affairs to an Official Receiver. If the documents are in
correct form and there is no creditor’s petition pending, the
Official Receiver must accept the petition. The individual
becomes bankrupt on the day the petition is accepted, and the
Official Receiver automatically becomes the trustee unless the

69

Ibid. at 1671.
Ibid. at 1672.
71
Richard H.W. Maloy, “Should Bankruptcy be Reserved for People Who have
Money? Or is the Bankruptcy Court a Court of the United States?” (1997) 7 J.
Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 at 28. The courts have generally found that due to the
Kras decision, the section is inapplicable to bankruptcy proceedings.
72
Rosalind Mason, “Consumer Bankruptcies: An Australian Perspective”
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 449 at 453. The Official Receiver in Australia is a
person who administers statutory functions under the Bankruptcy Act 1966
for the Australian government.
70
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individual nominates a privately registered trustee.73 In most
cases, the bankrupt will be automatically discharged after three
74
years.
Second, bankruptcy is available under Part X of the Bankruptcy
Act – a higher cost, more sophisticated process involving
lawyers. Third, debt agreements under Part IX of the Bankruptcy
Act are available to represent a low-cost alternative to
bankruptcy for those who can afford to make some payments.75
Proposals for debt agreements by low-income households are
processed by the public sector.76 When debt agreements were
introduced in 1996 they were intended as a “viable low-cost
alternative to bankruptcy for low-income debtors with little or
no property, with few creditors, and with low levels of liability,
for whom entry into Part X administration is not possible
because of inability to meet set up costs.”77 Debt agreements

73

Ibid. Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) as amended, s. 55.

74

The bankrupt will be automatically discharged after three years, unless (i)
an early discharge from bankruptcy has been granted by the trustee (only
applies to bankruptcies in existence prior to 5/5/03), (ii) an objection to
discharge has been filed by the trustee, or (iii) the bankruptcy has been
annulled.
See
ITSA,
“Bankruptcy
–
Long
Version,”
online:
<http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/bankruptcy>bankruptcy+-+long+version?opendocument#Discharge >.
75

See ITSA, online:
<http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/debt+agreements%3Epart+ix+debt+agreements?opendocument>. See also ITSA, “Review of
Debt Agreements Under Part IX of the Bankruptcy Act 1966,” online:
<http://www.imal.com.au/template/files/27/220805_Debt_Agreements_Cons
ultation_Paper.pdf> [Review of Debt Agreements].
76
Mason, supra note 72 at 453. When debt agreements were first introduced,
the cap on income was set at approximately $26, 000. In 2003, this was raised
to approximately $48, 000. Set up costs referred to here refer to Part X
administration.
77
Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 1996: Explanatory Memorandum,
at para. 135.16, cited in Mason, ibid. at 456.
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release the debtor from debts which would be provable in
bankruptcy in the same way that bankruptcy releases his or her
78
debts. Under this procedure, a debtor submits a proposal to the
Official Trustee, who determines whether the debtor meets the
eligibility requirements.79 The Insolvency and Trustee Service
Australia (ITSA) advises creditors of the proposal and allows
creditors to vote on it, during which time creditors’ proceedings
are stayed for enforcement of debts.80 If the proposal is accepted
by a majority in dollar value and at least 75 per cent of creditors
voting before the deadline, the debt agreement becomes
81
effective. Research conducted by the ITSA in 2003 has shown
that 65 per cent of debtors who entered into debt agreements
had income less than $30, 000, and “unemployment” followed
by “excessive use of credit” were the main attributed reasons for
insolvency.82
Under the Australian government's cost recovery policy, the
ITSA has adopted a formal cost recovery regime in respect of
fees and charges payable under the Bankruptcy Act and related
legislation. In 2004, the ITSA undertook a review of its fees and
charges, identifying which services should be cost recovered, the
type of charge to apply, who should pay, and which services
would be more appropriately covered through general taxation.83

78

Betty Weule, “Debt Agreements: can they work?” (2000) 10:1 New
Directions in Bankruptcy 11. Note, however, that the debtor must make
payments.
79
The Official Trustee in Australia is the government equivalent of a
registered private trustee.
80
Debts or liabilities arising from a maintenance agreement or maintenance
order are not stayed. The ITSA is the agency that becomes the trustee when a
private bankruptcy trustee is not appointed in a bankruptcy or other
arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act.
81
Mason, supra note 72 at 456-457.
82
ITSA, Review of Debt Agreements, supra note 68 at 4.
83
Bankruptcy Legislation (Fees and Charges) Bill 2006, Bills Digest no. 110
2005-06, online: Parliament of Australia <
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The new fees and charges are effective from July 1, 2006. There
is no fee for processing debtor petitions or debt agreement
84
proposals. The review recommended that a general levy be
imposed on debt agreements, noting that the use of debt
agreements had steadily increased since they first became
available.85 The government, however, decided against imposing
a levy on debt agreements to ensure that the agreements
“…continue to be available as a viable alternative to bankruptcy
86
for many debtors.”
The ITSA’s Cost Recovery Impact Statement indicated that a
$250 fee would have to be charged to recover the processing
costs of debtors’ Section 55 petitions and debt agreement
proposals.87 The ITSA deemed, however, that this fee would not
be consistent with broader bankruptcy objectives in providing a
88
broad community benefit and not just relief for debtors. During
the consultation process, proponents of the fee argued that
debtors receive a direct benefit, and given that debtors would
not have the same debt servicing burdens once their petition is

http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/pubs/BD/2005-06/06bd110.htm > [Bills
Digest no. 110 2005-06].
84
See fee schedule, effective 1 July 2006, online: Insolvency and Trustee
Service Australia
<http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/about%20us>cost%20recovery>cost%20recovery%20documents/$file/itsa_fees_and_charges_1_july_2006.p
df?openelement>.
85
Bills Digest no. 110 2005-06], supra note 75. See also ITSA, “Cost Recovery
Impact Statement” (February 2005), online:
<http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/About%20Us>Cost%20Recovery>Cost%20Recovery%20Documents/$FILE/CRIS_230205.pdf?OpenElement>
at 19.
86
Bills Digest no. 110 2005-06], ibid.
87
Cost Recovery Impact Statement, supra note 77 at 3.
88
Ibid..
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accepted, they should be able to afford the fee.89 Critics argued
that it would be counter-intuitive to subject debtors facing
financial hardship to the fee and that its imposition would deny
90
many debtors access to the system. Creditors noted that
ultimately they would end up paying the fee in many cases, as
debtors would choose not to pay certain bills, or would acquire
additional credit to pay the processing fee.91
Apart from charging no processing fees associated with Section
55 bankruptcy petitions and debt agreements, Australia’s regime
allows a debtor proceeding through the higher cost Part X
bankruptcy procedure to apply to have other fees associated
with bankruptcy waived. Examples of other fees include the
following: a $400 fee for the issue of bankruptcy notices; an
ITSA administration of estate fee for bankruptcy and debt
agreements, set at $3000 plus 20 per cent of the money received;
or for debt agreements, a fee representing 20 per cent of the
92
value of the proposal accepted by creditors. Subregulation 16.11
of the Bankruptcy Regulations provides for waiver or remission
of fees by the Inspector-General, if the Inspector-General is
reasonably satisfied that (a) payment of the fee by the person
liable to pay it has imposed, or would impose, undue hardship
on the person; or (b) because of other exceptional circumstances,
it is proper and reasonable to do so.93 The regulations define
undue hardship as “hardship that is unusual and exceptional in
comparison to the hardship arising in the normal course of
94
bankruptcy.”

89

Ibid. at 17-18.
Ibid. at 18.
91
Ibid.
92
See Bills Digest no. 110 2005-06, supra note 83.
93
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 – Reg. 16.11(1) and (2), online: Australasian
Legal Information Institute
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/br1996251/s16.11.html>.
94
Ibid., Reg. 16.11(3).
90
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C. NEW ZEALAND
The New Zealand government has recently introduced the
Insolvency Law Reform Bill which includes a “no income no
asset procedure” as an alternative to adjudication on a debtor’s
95
application. The proposed reforms are set to expand the role of
the Official Assignee, whereby all debtors will have to consult
with an Official Assignee before invoking any of the
proceedings, making bankruptcy an administrative procedure.96
Under the proposed new regime, a debtor will be required to file
a financial statement of affairs with the Official Assignee before
pursuing bankruptcy or the no asset procedure option.97 The
Official Assignee will not only provide advice and information,
Thomas Telfer notes, but render substantive decisions on the
options pursued.98 Telfer cautiously suggests that the retention
of the Official Assignees’ monopoly over bankruptcy
administration may avoid some of the problems associated with
a private trustee system, such as Canada’s, where private
trustees face potential conflicts of interest. However, Telfer does
draw attention to the multiple roles the Official Assignee will

95

Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill (April 2004), online: Ministry of
Economic Development (New Zealand)
<http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/21201/draft-bill.pdf > [Draft Insolvency
Law Reform Bill].
96
Thomas G.W. Telfer, “New Zealand Bankruptcy Law Reform: The New
Role of the Official Assignee and the Prospects for a No-Asset Regime” in
Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective, Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen,
Iain Ramsay & William C. Whitford, eds. (Oxford and Portland: Hart
Publishing, 2003) 247 at 248. The Official Assignee is a statutory position
created by the Insolvency Act 1967. When an Official Assignee is appointed
to act in respect of a bankruptcy, they act as an officer of the court.
97
Ibid. at 257; Insolvency Law Reform Bill, Explanatory Note, online:
<http://www.knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpprint/docs/bills/20050141.txt>
[Explanatory Note].
98
Telfer, ibid. at 257.
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have to play under the proposed reforms and the potential for
99
conflicts.
The New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development describes
the no asset procedure as providing “…an alternative to
bankruptcy for insolvent debtors with nominal debts, no assets
and who have no means to repay the debt.”100 Part 5, subpart 4 of
the bill sets out the rules relating to the no asset procedure. The
starting point is the same for proceeding in bankruptcy:
furnishing a statement of the debtor's affairs. Based on the
statement of affairs, the Assignee will decide whether the debtor
qualifies for entry to the no asset procedure. The bill outlines
criteria for entry to the no asset procedure: no assets, total debts
between $1,000 and $40,000, no means to repay any amount,
and a clean financial record (not previously bankrupt, not
previously admitted to the no asset procedure).101 Once admitted
to the no asset procedure, the debtor enjoys a moratorium on his
or her debts—with some exceptions, they cannot be enforced
while the debtor is in the no asset procedure. After 12 months,
the debtor is discharged and the debts are cancelled.102 However,
if the no asset procedure terminates at any time before the 12month period has elapsed, the debtor's debts will become
enforceable.103

99

Ibid. at 258-259.
Ministry of Economic Development, “Bankruptcy Administration: No
Asset Procedure and Insolvency Act Changes – Regulatory Impact
Statement” (1 December 2003), online: Ministry of Economic Development
(New Zealand)
<http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentTOC____6249.aspx
>.
101
See Explanatory Note, supra note 88; Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill,
supra note 86, cl. 347.
102
Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill, ibid., cl. 357.
103
Ibid., cl. 356.
100
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The Assignee will have a limited role in the process because the
debtor by definition has no assets: he or she must ensure that an
applicant is qualified for entry, provide creditors with an
opportunity to object to a debtor being admitted to the no asset
procedure, ensure that a debtor who has been admitted
improperly is removed, and terminate the no asset procedure at
the request of the debtor if the Assignee is satisfied that the
debtor, through changed circumstances, can make payment
104
towards his or her debts. The benefit of the no asset procedure
is that an individual’s debts are cancelled on discharge. Telfer
notes that the Official Assignee will have to play a gate-keeping
function through the control of access to the regime.105 He
argues that if the no asset procedure adopted by Parliament
incorporates a number of subjective standards (such as entry
criteria to determine who may access the procedure), the
benefits of a streamlined no fault bankruptcy procedure will be
lost.106
Under the system currently in place in New Zealand, a debtor
may apply to a District Court for a summary installment order if
his or her debts amount to less than $12 000, where a District
Court Judge makes an order that is binding on creditors. An
installment order provides that a debtor may pay back his or her
debts without the threat of legal action while the order is in
force; the process is administered by a third party supervisor and
imposes no costs on the debtor.107 If a debtor decides to petition
for bankruptcy, there is a $40 filing fee in the High Court,
although a debtor may apply to have the fee waived if he or she

104

Ibid., cl. 347-351, 354, and 355. See also Explanatory Note, supra note 88.
Telfer, supra note 96 at 265.
106
Ibid. at 268.
107
Insolvency and Trustee Service (New Zealand), Personal Bankruptcy
Toolkit, online: <www.insolvency.gov.nz/its-docs/I/its-bankruptcy-manual28June.pdf> at 6.
105
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cannot afford the cost.108 However, if a debtor wishes to apply for
an early discharge (prior to the end of the three year period) she
must retain counsel and appear in the High Court at
considerable expense.

D. ENGLAND AND WALES
England and Wales have also embarked on insolvency law
reform, proposing a no income, no asset (NINA) procedure
similar to that in New Zealand. In 2004, the Department for
Constitutional Affairs (DCA) published a consultation paper
entitled “A Choice of Paths: better options to manage overindebtedness and multiple debt.”109 With regard to “can’t pay”110
debtors, the paper proposed two options: the introduction of a
court-based debt relief order and a NINA procedure.111 Under the
former option, a debtor would be released from his or her debts
after 12 months unless a creditor could provide evidence of nondeclared assets. The recommendations for this option included a
debt limit and an unspecified fee for debtors to enter the
scheme.112 Since the publication of this report, the England and
Wales’ insolvency service has focused on the latter NINA
option, and developed what it deems “…a non-court based
scheme of debt relief that would alleviate debt in certain cases
where there is currently no realistic alternative, but which is
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Ibid. at 7.
Department for Constitutional Affairs, “A Choice of Paths: better options
to manage over-indebtedness and multiple debt” (20 July 2004), online:
<http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/debt/debt.pdf#search=%22A%20Choice%2
0of%20Paths%3A%20%20better%20options%20to%20manage%20overindebtedness%20and%20multiple%20debt%22 >.
110
“Can’t pay” in this context refers to debtors who cannot pay off their debts
as opposed to debtors who cannot pay trustee fees.
111
Ibid. at 43.
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simple and likely to be relatively cheap to administer.”113 The
scheme is aimed at those people who cannot pay “even a portion
114
of their debt within a reasonable timeframe” —people with no
assets, very little income, and a relatively low level of liabilities,
and who cannot access any of the debt solutions available (such
as bankruptcy).115
In March 2005, the Insolvency Service published a paper for
discussion focusing solely on the NINA procedure, recognizing
that “[t]here is a category of person who has fallen into debt and
has no way out of it.”116 U.K. research has shown that “the great
majority of people who fall into arrears with their household
bills or credit commitments do so because they are in financial
difficulty resulting from a change in circumstance or living long
term on a low income.”117 These debtors simply lack the money
to make payments on time, and include people on low incomes
who face unexpected expenditure, people who have had a
sudden substantial fall in income leaving them unable to meet
all their commitments, and people with mental health problems
118
which impair their ability to manage their finances. In England
and Wales, the current fee to petition for bankruptcy is £310,
even if the debtor qualifies for remission of or exemption from
court fees. The current fee for administering bankruptcy is
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The Insolvency Service (United Kingdom), “Relief for the Indebted – An
Alternative to Bankruptcy” (March 2005), online:
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc
_register/consultationpaperwithnewannex1.pdf > at 5 [“Relief for the
Indebted”].
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Nicola Dominy & Elaine Kempson, “Can't Pay or Won't Pay?: A Review of
Creditor and Debtor Approaches to the Non-Payment of Bills” (2003). For a
summary of the report, see Department for Constitutional Affairs (United
Kingdom), online: <http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2003/4-03es.htm>.
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£1625.119 Ideally, the U.K. report notes, each bankruptcy estate
should cover the costs of its administration. However, this does
not always occur, with the result of bankruptcies where there
are assets subsidizing those where there are none. Waiving the
£310 fee, the report argues, would mean that cross subsidization
between cases would increase.120
The NINA scheme proposed by the paper would be operated by
Official Receivers, who would be responsible for making debt
relief orders that would result in debtors being discharged from
their debts after a period of one year. The procedure would
require an up front entry fee, but less than the deposit required
to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. As well, debtors would have
to meet certain criteria to make use of the scheme.121 The
consultation paper proposed a restriction on number of times a
person could apply for an order, and recommended the use of an
approved intermediary to collect information about the debtor’s
affairs, assist in filling out forms, and filter unsuitable
122
To balance the rights of creditors, the paper
applicants.
suggested a means for creditors to object to the making of an
order on various grounds, such as failure to disclose assets,
income or liabilities.123 The scheme would preserve the ultimate
right of appeal to the courts.
After the consultation paper was published and comments
received, the Insolvency Service published a second paper
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highlighting the responses.124 The paper put forth the following
125
recommendations:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

an up front, non-refundable fee paid by debtor to administer
the debt order relief scheme, no more than £100;126
an administrative order, without the intervention of the
courts;
a restriction on the number of times a debtor can obtain an
order (no more than once every six years);
the use of an approved intermediary by the debtor when
applying for an order, with intermediaries to be properly
funded;
a cap on permitted liabilities of £15 000;127
a cap on surplus income of £50 per month with surplus
income determined through a common financial statement,
with the ability to review the cap so it can be amended if
appropriate;
an asset limit at £300, but kept under review so it can be
amended if appropriate; and
provision for an appropriate range of remedies to tackle
misconduct by the debtor.128

More recently, the U.K. government has put forward
recommendations for the other option identified in the 2004
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The Insolvency Service (United Kingdom), “Relief for the Indebted -- an
Alternative to Bankruptcy: Summary of Responses and Government Reply”
(November 2005), online:
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc
_register/relieffortheindebtedanalternativetobankruptcyresponse.pdf#search=
%22%22Relief%20for%20the%20Indebted%22%22>.
125
Ibid., at 5-7.
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For further detail, see ibid. at 12-13.
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The paper recommends that secured debt be included for the purposes of
ascertaining the level of liabilities; the position of secured creditors would
not be affected as they would retain their security. Ibid. at 22.
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report: the availability of a court based debt relief order. Rather
than implementing a court-based debt relief order, however, the
DCA has advocated the administrative NINA scheme, deeming
the court-based option not cost effective for “can’t pay”
129
These reforms are encompassed in the Draft
debtors.
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill as a means to provide
debt relief for people in England and Wales who cannot access
currently available remedies, and who have no way to pay what
130
they owe.
An annex to the bill outlines the various options considered by
the U.K. government for “can’t pay” debtors: removing the
requirement for people without assets or surplus income to pay
a deposit when presenting a petition for bankruptcy; persuading
creditors to voluntarily write off debt where there is no prospect
that the debt will be paid within a reasonable amount of time; or
introducing legislation to enable poor people who are financially
excluded to access a system of debt relief.131 Preferring a
legislative response, the report suggests that the proposal for the
NINA scheme would benefit the indebted individual in terms of
reduced stress and the effect on health accompanying it,132
provide an opportunity for a fresh start and allow him or her to
“learn to manage their finances in more favourable

129

Administration Orders, Enforcement Restriction Orders and Non-Court
Based Debt Management Schemes (July 2006), online: <http://www.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm68/6885/6885.pdf > at 109.
130
The Insolvency Service, “Plans to Bring Debt Relief to the Socially
Excluded,” n.d., online:
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/intermed
iariesworkingroup/debtrelief.htm>.
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Department for Constitutional Affairs (United Kingdom), Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Bill: Regulatory Impact Assessments, Part V, “Debt
Relief Orders – full RIA” (July 2006), online: <http://www.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm68/6885/6885.pdf > at 117-118.
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circumstances”,133 and free up court time in cases where
creditors are pursuing enforcement action where there is no
134
hope of repayment. The DCA anticipates the scheme will
entail initial set up costs, but with an upfront fee (less than
current bankruptcy deposit), it will be possible to meet ongoing
administration costs.135 The DCA predicts the number of people
who would use the NINA scheme would plateau at 34, 000 to
36, 000 after two years, and would increase or decrease with the
136
number of bankruptcies after that point. Approximately 11 per
cent of people currently presenting a bankruptcy petition would
be eligible for the new scheme.137 The scheme, the DCA
predicts, will apply to a substantial portion of those seeking
advice for debt related problems, who owe less than the
proposed liability cap of £15, 000 and/or are not homeowners.138
The NINA procedure is not currently in effect in England and
Wales.

E. THE NETHERLANDS
The Dutch bankruptcy procedure is of relatively recent origin,
dating back only to 1998. Accordingly, a less detailed account is
provided of this system. The Dutch experience is especially
relevant to this paper because the majority of the overindebted
in the Netherlands are poor in the sense used in our discussion
of the Canadian situation. Prior to the introduction of a
bankruptcy procedure in the Netherlands, insolvent debtors
could attempt to come to voluntary agreement with their

133
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creditors, aided by counsellors from non-profit organizations.139
Failing that, judicial enforcement of the debts would generally
140
lead to all of the debtor’s income above the social minimum
being assigned to the creditors.
The 1998 bankruptcy law is known by its Dutch acronym
WSNB (wet schuldsanering natuurlijke personen or law on debt
rehabilitation of natural persons).141 From a North American
perspective, the WSNB is more similar to a lengthy courtordered repayment plan than to a fresh start. Eligible debtors
must agree to live at the social minimum for three years, giving
over the remainder of their income to their creditors. The
agreement is supervised by court-appointed trustee who
monitors the debtor’s financial situation with the aid of a
“postblokkade” which involves all of the debtor’s mail being
142
opened by the trustee. Debtors can use the WSNB only if they

139

The main actors in this area are the network of municipal banks (known
by their Dutch acronym, VKB) which are supervised and funded by Dutch
municipalities. Apart from the VKB, debt counselling is done by an array of
government social welfare agencies, non-profit organizations and church
groups.
140
The “social minimum serves as a policy boundary by which people have
access to sufficient financial resources to achieve a ‘minimum acceptable
lifestyle’ for the Netherlands.”
http://internationalezaken.szw.nl/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_rubriek&rubrie
k_id=190093 (viewed 17 December 2006). Used for a variety of purposes, the
social minimum was 578.24 a month for a single person and 1,156.54 for a
couple in 2004-2005.
141
See www.wsnp.rvr.org, a website devoted to the WSNP for details about
the law
142
For an English language description of the Dutch law see Jason Kilborn,
“The Hidden Life of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Danger Signs for the
New U.S. Law From Unexpected Parallel in the Netherlands” (2006) 39
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 77. See also Huls, Nick, Nadja
Jungmann and Bert Niemayer, “Can Voluntary Debt Settlement and
Consumer Bankruptcy Coexist? The Development of Dutch Bankruptcy
Law” in (eds.) Niemi-Kiesilainen, Johanna, Iain Ramsay and William
Whitford, Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparative Context, (Oxford: Hart
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have previously tried, and failed, to come to a voluntary
143
agreement with their creditors.
In Jason Kilborn’s 2006 article, he makes reference to a 1997
report that 71 percent of debtors seeking debt counselling had
income less than $12,000 (roughly the Dutch social
minimum).144 The director of a prominent municipal bank (or
VKB in its Dutch acronym) in the northeast of Holland recently
reported that roughly 80 per cent of those seeking debt
145
counselling relied on social welfare payments. These debtors
pay no out-of-pocket costs for either debt counselling or for their
participation in the WSNB. All costs are paid either by
municipal governments (which pays the counsellors an annual
fee for each of their activities) or by the creditors. The various
costs of the WSNB, such as the fee paid to the court-appointed
trustee, are drawn from the payments made by the debtor from
their income above the social minimum. In effect, since these
funds would otherwise accrue to the creditors, creditors pay for
these services.

Publishing, 2003). In addition, Nadja Jungmann recently published her Ph.D.
thesis on Dutch insolvency law. See
http://www.aup.nl/do.php?a=show_visitor_booklist&b=auteursaz&auteur=Ju
ngmann%2C+Nadja.
143
One of the unintended side-effects of the introduction of the WSNB has
been the declining rate of successful voluntary agreements. The success rate
has fallen to about 10% after being close to 50% early in the 1990s. The
intended effect of the WSNB was exactly the opposite—to increase the
success rate of voluntary agreements. By paying the costs of the judicial
procedure from payments that would otherwise have gone to creditors, the
framers of the legislation hoped to make the judicial procedure relatively
unattractive. However, creditors seem to believe that the benefits of the
oversight of the court-appointed trustee are large enough to offset the
relatively small increased cost. See Huls. et al.,ibid.
144
Kilborn 2006, supra 142 at 13.
145
Interview with Harro Norder, director of the Volkscredietbank Noord-Ost,
December 2006.
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Middle-class overindebtedness is relatively rare in the
Netherlands. While the use of consumer credit is rising, it
remains well below the level of other European countries and far
below North American levels. The requirement that debtors
using the WSNB live at the social minimum for three years is
therefore less burdensome than it would be if the majority of
debtors were not already living at that level.
In summary, the Dutch bankruptcy system disproportionately
serves poor debtors who rely on social welfare payments. No
out-of-pocket costs must be paid by the debtor to gain access to
the judicial debt adjustment procedure or to use the debt
counsellors provided by the municipalities. That said, the
WSNB does not provide the sort of fresh start that is available in
the other jurisdictions canvassed.
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VI. POSSIBLE MODELS FOR THE CANADIAN
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
The most problematic aspect of the current Canadian system is
that depending on where they live, poor debtors in Canada
apparently face different prospects for being able to access the
bankruptcy system and face different costs for doing so. In each
interview, drawing on the Australian model, we suggested an
option that would see poor debtors fill out a simple set of forms
and then go to a kiosk in the local shopping mall where the
forms and supporting documents could be filed and the
bankruptcy accomplished. We also discussed a variant in which
a trustee (or other qualified insolvency professional) might
assess the debtor’s case before he or she was eligible to use the
kiosk. None of the trustees interviewed thought that either
option was a good idea.

A. TRUSTEE’S VIEWS ON POSSIBLE MODELS
1. UNANIMITY AGAINST A GOVERNMENT-OPERATED SYSTEM
Perhaps not surprisingly, the private trustees that we
interviewed were unanimous in rejecting the idea of a new
government-funded and government-staffed program that would
handle the bankruptcies of poor debtors. Several recognized that
their opposition would be expected given that any new
government-provided service would compete with their own
practice. However, it seems clear that their opposition goes
beyond simple self-interest.
The trustees agreed that a trained professional should be fairly
closely involved in order to handle unexpected situations. One
noted that the “trustee learns more about the cases over the
nine months, information that would not be available at the
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time of application.”146 With this in mind, all of the trustees we
spoke to expressed the belief that a government program would
require one of two unpalatable staffing options. One option
would involve the training of a whole new cadre of insolvency
professionals to replace the work now done by trustees. The
trustees saw little benefit in training a new group to undertake
work that they themselves have been trained to do. A second
option would be to use less well-trained staff on the assumption
that poor debtors will have simple bankruptcy cases; the
trustees thought that such staff would not be able to handle the
particularities that often arise even in simple cases. Several
harked back to the days of Federal Insolvency Trustee Agency
(FITA) which seems to be universally reviled as having failed
because of the incompetence of its staff.147 One said that there
are “lots of horror stories from FITA. Files that never got closed,
people not getting real assets.”148 Another believed that “the
government employees [of FITA] were not qualified [to
149
administer bankruptcies].” Still another asserted that “the
system collapsed because the government was not equipped to
handle it and debtors were not advised properly” and that

146

Interview with Trustee 2, 8 September 2006.
The federal government introduced FITA in 1972 to provide services for
those debtors who could not afford a trustee. By 1977, between one third and
one half of bankruptcies proceeded under FITA. The program was
discontinued in 1979: Igor Livshits, James McGee & Michèle Tertilt,
“Accounting for the Rise in Consumer Bankruptcies in Canada and the
United States,” (9 March 2005) online: York University Department of
Economics <http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/seminars/20042005/BankruptcyRise.pdf#search=%22FITA%20bankruptcy%22>. Despite
the oft-heard opinion that FITA was disastrous because bankruptcies were
mishandled by incompetent or poorly trained staff, we have seen no
documentary evidence of the shortcomings of FITA.
148
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“debtors were not discharged [because] the system was not
150
tracking them.”
2. Unanimity Against Making Access Too Easy
The trustees we interviewed had either participated in a BAP
case or worked on a number of files with less than $500 in
receipts. All but one were working in firms in which a large part
of the work was in consumer bankruptcy and all showed
considerable understanding and sympathy for the plight of poor
debtors. Nonetheless, even these trustees felt strongly that
bankruptcy should not be made too easy and that the absence of
significant barriers would lead to the abuse of credit and to the
abuse of the bankruptcy system.
Apart from their concerns about the staffing of the kiosks, the
trustees felt that the kiosk option (or any sort of “car wash”
form of bankruptcy) would not provide enough rehabilitation
(such as they believe arises from mandatory bankruptcy
counselling). A system that allowed too easy a discharge would
not teach the debtor any lessons about the misuse of credit and
would presumably lead to repeated credit trouble. One trustee
felt that counselling made debtors face their responsibility for
incurring the debts that led to the bankruptcy and thought that
bankruptcy “shouldn’t be a wash.”151 Others152 were concerned
that the debtors would not learn anything if the procedure were
too simple: “They need to learn something so they don’t come
153
Another thought that in the current system, “the
back.”
debtors have responsibilities—to get counselling, to report
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changes in their situation, to make monthly payments, to turn
154
over their financial affairs to the trustee.”

B. OPTIONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A review of the systemic attempts to address the issue of access
to bankruptcy for the poor in the United States, Australia, New
Zealand, England and Wales, and Netherlands presents two
main options for reform to the Canadian system:
i. Fee waiver provisions in bankruptcy proceedings; and/or
ii. A no income no asset procedure with either a public or
private intermediary.
The experience of the American pilot project undertaken in the
mid-1990s suggests the number of bankruptcy filings will not
increase significantly with the availability of a fee waiver
system. Australia and New Zealand are the only jurisdictions to
provide no fee options to process debtor petitions or debt
agreement proposals. Although the Australian government has
considered adopting fees to help fund the system, it has recently
concluded that this would conflict with the public policy
objectives of the Australian bankruptcy system, and as such it is
more appropriate that the processing costs be funded by
taxpayers.
Australia, New Zealand, and England and Wales have all
adopted or considered administrative solutions to assist low
income debtors. Australia’s Section 55 system for example
allows individuals to quickly be declared bankrupt without the
involvement of the courts. Recognizing that poor debtors require
an alternative to filing for bankruptcy in the courts, England and
Wales and New Zealand are proposing NINA procedures where
debtors may obtain a discharge after one year. The advantages of

154
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these procedures include a streamlined, out-of-court, less costly
process for the debtor. In the Netherlands, where the poor are
the majority of those seeking debt resolution, debtors pay no
fees.

C. RECENT CANADIAN REFORM EFFORTS
During the deliberations of the Canadian Personal Insolvency
Task Force (PITF), a subgroup was assigned to address issues
around the “administration process.” The subgroup quickly
became focused on the idea of creating a “fast track” process for
the many bankruptcy files that are quite simple, involving no
significant assets and little prospect of creditors receiving any
significant dividends.
A key decision, made without extensive open discussion, was
that the “fast track” process would lie within the existing
Canadian bankruptcy system. The essential features of that
system—the administration of bankruptcies by private sector
trustees, fees paid to trustees who have the discretion to ask for
voluntary payments, and substantial information provided to
creditors and to the OSB—would be maintained. The primary
alternative—a public system with low fees and limited
information provided either to creditors or to the OSB—was not
seriously discussed despite the efforts of Iain Ramsay, one of the
subgroup members. In a discussion on the Australian system,
the subgroup wrote that, given the current Canadian system, a
shift to a system with the role of trustee filled by a public actor
would be “politically unfeasible.”155
The definition of eligibility for the “fast track” process was not
based on any notion of the need for low-cost bankruptcy
services. The subgroup mentioned that there are no reliable data

155

“Preliminary Draft #2” (PITF subgroup deliberations, 27 November 2000)
[unpublished] at 6.
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suggesting that there is an issue with access to bankruptcy for
156
and one member questioned whether the
poor debtors,
157
subgroup should address affordability at all. Instead, “fast
track” bankruptcies would be those that seemed to be pose few
administrative burdens. In its recommendations for the
summary process, the subgroup suggested that trustees need not
produce a section 170 report in cases where first-time bankrupts
receive an automatic discharge, have no oppositions filed, have
158
no surplus income, and pose no other issues. The group also
recommended that the OSB letter of comment, which was
mandatory in the previous system, become optional at the OSB’s
discretion.159 Because “fast track” debtors would have no
significant assets and no income above the OSB’s Surplus
Income Guidelines, their cases would require less trustee time
to dispose of their assets or collect Surplus Income payments.

156

Ibid. at 9.
John Eisner quoted in “Record of Decision From Conference Call” (PITF
subgroup deliberations, 15 November 2000) [unpublished].

157
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Synopsis of Working Group 1 Recommendations: Summary Process” (PITF
subgroup deliberations,) [unpublished] at 3. Section 170 of the BIA provides
that as part of the bankruptcy discharge process, the trustee must prepare a
report in the prescribed form with respect to:
(a) the affairs of the bankrupt,
(b) the causes of his bankruptcy,
(c) the manner in which the bankrupt has performed the duties imposed
on him under this Act or obeyed the orders of the court,
(d) the conduct of the bankrupt both before and after the date of the
initial bankruptcy event,
(e) whether the bankrupt has been convicted of any offence under this
Act, and
(f)
any other fact, matter or circumstance that would justify the court in
refusing an unconditional order of discharge.
159

Ibid, at 4.
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The subgroup (and the PITF as a whole) decided not to tackle the
controversial issue of the fees charged by the trustees. Within
160
trustees set these fees
the framework of Rule 128(1),
themselves (often by asking for voluntary payments),
presumably in line with what the market will bear. The
subgroup recommended more transparency in trustee fees, with
some members suggesting that allowing trustees to advertise
their prices might create competition, drive prices down, and
161
give “incentives for efficiency in administration.” However,
other
members
expressed
reservations,
as
“debtors
contributions…are subject to change during a bankruptcy,
making it impossible to fix a cost.”162 If the “fast track”
procedure leads to a lower amount of time spent on most cases,
competition among trustees may lead to lower fees. However,
the market for trustee services is far from the model of perfect
competition since trustees must be licensed (limiting the supply
of those authorized to administer bankruptcies), there is at least
the possibility of collusion among trustees in establishing fees
(via practices on voluntary payments), and consumer
information is quite imperfect. Several of the trustees we
interviewed thought that competition would not drive down
fees.
The Joint CAIRP/IIC submission to the Standing Senate
Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce163 acknowledges
that the dissenting members of the PITF raised several issues in
respect of access to the process that require further investigation
and study, including: how the costs of an alternative process
would be covered; how access for such debtors would be
increased through any alternative process; and how the integrity

160
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of the system would be maintained or enhanced. CAIRP/IIC
made two recommendations in respect of access to information
and assistance to debtors with no assets and no income. First,
they recommended that where bankruptcy would be a helpful
remedy, “there should be enhanced information to debtors
regarding their options, including greater awareness of the
trustee referral program [the BAP].” Second, they recommended
that “for individuals who do not even need access to the
system…the Superintendent’s office, by enhancing its current
information dissemination, could address issues such as
garnishees and how to get them lifted or reduced; how to stop
harassing phone calls from collection agencies; strategies to deal
with temporary layoffs and salary reductions; and key telephone
numbers through which to access these remedies and other
public agencies.”164
Neither of the CAIRP/IIC recommendations were adopted in the
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade
and Commerce [Senate Report].165 The Senate Report did not
address trustee fees directly.166 While the PITF Final Report did
include many of the subgroup’s recommendations, it did not
explicitly refer to a “fast track” process, but suggest reforming
the current system in such a way that section 170 reports and
OSB letters of comment are produced “by exception rather than

164

Ibid.
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce, “Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the
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Act” (November 2003), online: Senate of Canada, Banking, Trade and
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by rule.”167 The PITF Final Report agreed with the subgroup that
in simple bankruptcy cases, without complicating factors like
surplus income or an opposition filed, there should not be a
168
requirement that the trustee produce a section 170 report. As
well, if the OSB does not feel that there are issues or problems,
the PITF recommended that it not be required to issue a letter of
comment.169 The Senate Report largely endorsed the PITF Final
Report’s “by exception rather than by rule” proposal, writing
that the changes would “respect the fundamental principles of
efficiency and effectiveness.”170 Unlike the PITF subgroup, the
Senate Report recognized that “access to the bankruptcy system
is increasingly compromised for low-asset, low-income debtors,”
although it did not recommend adopting a NINA process.171
Most recently, Statute c. 47172 has followed the
recommendations of the PITF Final Report and proposed the
following revision to section 170(1) of the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act (BIA): “The trustee shall, in the prescribed
circumstances and at the prescribed times, prepare a report, in
the prescribed form, with respect to…” The previous wording
simply stated, “The trustee shall prepare a report in the
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Canada, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Final Report, (Ottawa:
Personal Insolvency Task Force, 2002) [PITF Final Report] at 55.
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An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st
Sess., 38th Parl., 2005 (received Royal Assent on 25 November 2005; not
currently in force), online: Parliament of Canada <
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Pa
rl=38&Ses=1&Mode=1&Pub=Bill&Doc=C-55_4 > [Statute c. 47].
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prescribed form with respect to…”173 The clause-by-clause
briefing for the proposed legislation states that the rationale
behind the revision is to streamline the process by limiting the
174
circumstances under which the report must be prepared. The
briefing anticipates that a section 170 report will only be
required where the bankrupt has Surplus Income; where an
opposition to the bankrupt's discharge has been filed; where the
bankrupt has been bankrupt on a previous occasion; where there
is any reason that would require a court hearing of the discharge;
or where the trustee, for other reasons, determines that the
report would be required.175
Statute c. 47 also provides for the following new section (s.
156.1) to allow bankrupts to enter into an agreement to pay for
the trustee’s fees after the bankruptcy period:
An individual bankrupt who has never before been
bankrupt under the laws of Canada or of any
prescribed jurisdiction and who is not required to
make payments under section 68 to the estate of the
bankrupt may enter into an agreement with the
trustee to pay the trustee's fees and disbursements if
the total amount required to be paid under the
agreement is not more than the prescribed amount and
that total amount is to be paid before the expiry of the
12-month period after the bankrupt's discharge. The
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See “BIA Discharge of bankrupts: Clause by Clause Briefing Book” (n.d.),
online: Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy (Industry Canada)
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/incilp-pdci.nsf/en/cl00814e.html#7>.
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agreement may be enforced after the bankrupt's
176
discharge.
The clause-by-clause briefing notes that this new section is
intended
…to provide a mechanism which will enhance
accessibility to the insolvency system for individuals
who do not have surplus income and who may
otherwise have difficulty paying the costs associated
with the administration of a bankruptcy. In some
circumstances, especially bankruptcies with small
estates, it is difficult for a person to find a trustee
willing to act for them because the trustees require
payment for their services. If the estate is too small, no
trustee will act. This has the effect of leaving the
vulnerable person without professional assistance
during a difficult experience. By providing that the
bankrupt may pay for the trustee's services after the
bankruptcy period, the reform should ensure that more
people get the assistance they need. Balancing this
reform is the limit on fees that can be charged by a
trustee pursuant to the rules.177

176
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
In this final section of the paper, we propose three sets of
recommendations. Each set of recommendations addresses the
two principal flaws we believe are present in the current
Canadian system:
i. No national and even local uniformity exists in the
treatment of poor debtors.
ii. Poor debtors face informational and financial barriers that
may impede equal access to the fresh start provided by
bankruptcy.
Within each set of our recommendations, there are some that
may be implemented quite quickly and with limited cost to the
OSB. Others will take longer to implement and will require
additional consultation and funding.
The two flaws highlighted by our research do not lead us to
recommend the adoption of a separate bankruptcy scheme for
poor debtors. Instead, following the lead of other jurisdictions,
we recommend that Canada adopt a BAP program that
eliminates the out-of-pocket costs for poor debtors. These costs
could be eliminated with a combination of fee waivers (e.g.,
waiving the OSB’s filing fee) and government subsidy (e.g.,
having the OSB pay for the mandatory counselling sessions). A
BAP program that demands no out-of-pocket payments by poor
debtors would address the financial barriers they face. To deal
with the informational barriers, we recommend the creation of
an impartial agency that provides advice and support to poor
debtors trying to deal with collection efforts. By making the
judgement-proof status of poor debtors clear, such advice and
support would limit the number of debtors who use the
bankruptcy process. To increase the uniformity and certainty of
bankruptcy across the country, we propose a method for creating
parity while encouraging the voluntary agreements among
trustees that exist in some cities.
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A. REFORM OF BAP REGULATIONS
Our research suggests that a thorough revision of the rules
governing the operation of the BAP program is necessary. Our
review of the program suggests that the following changes are
highly desirable.

1. WIDESPREAD AND IMPROVED PUBLICITY OF THE BAP IS REQUIRED.
One reason for the infrequent use of the BAP is that the OSB has
made no systematic efforts to make its existence known to poor
debtors. Much more information on the operation of the BAP
program should be made easily accessible to debtors and
trustees. Detailed information on the BAP should be provided to
poverty clinics, credit counsellors and trustees. The information
on the OSB website related to the BAP should be updated and
improved. The information is difficult to find and does not give
a balanced and accurate sense of the program. For example, the
website currently gives the impression that the BAP requires pro
bono work by trustees.
2. A

CLEAR ELIGIBILITY STANDARD FOR THE

BAP

SHOULD BE PUT

INTO PLACE.

Further consultation should be undertaken to determine the
exact nature of a new BAP eligibility standard. Based on our
research to date, we recommend a standard involving low
current income and a long-term history of receipt of government
transfers. Using low current income alone might lead to abuse
by debtors who only temporarily have low income. The
appropriate requirement might be that eligible debtors must be
in receipt of government transfers (such as income assistance,
unemployment insurance or disability benefits) for twelve of the
previous eighteen months. Some form of procedural fairness will
need to be built into such a bright line eligibility standard. For

54

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 02

example, appeals should be allowed by a debtor who is newly
poor or disabled and likely to stay that way.
Under this new eligibility standard, the requirement that
debtors must visit two trustees to qualify for the BAP should be
eliminated. This requirement imposes an additional barrier to
bankruptcy that other higher income debtors do not face. The
current requirement has a detrimental impact on women in
particular, as they must often find child care for their children as
they move around the city obtaining opinions from two trustees.
3. FEES
WAIVED.

FOR DEBTORS WHO QUALIFY FOR THE

BAP

SHOULD BE

Ideally, poor debtors should be able to file for bankruptcy
without paying any of the out-of-pocket costs. Receipts from tax
refunds would remain in the estate as would any proceeds from
the sale of non-exempt assets. The fee waiver could be financed
by a combination of OSB waivers, OSB payments to trustees for
counselling or pro bono work by trustees. Further consultation
needs to be done with trustees, combined with a careful cost
analysis by the OSB, in order to determine the ideal solution. In
the interim, we recommend that the $75 filing fee be eliminated
and that the OSB cover the cost of both counselling sessions.
The high mean level of fees in BAP cases means that trustees
can recover significant amounts without voluntary payments.
4. THE BAP

SHOULD PROVIDE THAT THE

OSB

WILL FILE THE

BANKRUPTCY AS A LAST RESORT.

The regulations (and the expanded publicity recommended
above) should indicate the OSB’s commitment to ensuring that
the bankruptcy will be filed in a timely fashion even if no
private trustee is forthcoming, and even if an OSB official must
administer the bankruptcy.
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B. WORKING TOWARD UNIFORMITY
Poor debtors throughout Canada should have access to the
reformed BAP. However, our interviews suggested that trustees
are not happy with the existing BAP and, where possible, prefer
to rely on voluntary agreements among area trustees or on the
good will of individual trustees. At least until the reformed BAP
can gain the trust of trustees, we recommend that the voluntary
agreements among trustees be encouraged and perhaps expanded
in scope. However, these voluntary systems should be at least as
cheap as BAP. A first step would be to assess the extent of the
geographic coverage of the agreements. CAIRP could become
involved by surveying their members to make an inventory of
such agreements. Second, the OSB should keep track of files
where receipts are low to see if they are spread, in a
representative way, across the country.178
5. THE OSB

SHOULD ESTABLISH, BY DIRECTIVE, A SYSTEM FOR

REGISTERING CITY SPECIFIC FEE AGREEMENTS REACHED BY TRUSTEES.

While we believe that the voluntary agreements should be
encouraged, we also think the OSB should make sure that it is
aware of all such agreements and that the terms of the
agreements are consistent with the aim of the reformed BAP—
ease of access and no out-of-pocket costs to the debtor. In the
end, it is not obvious whether it will be better to have only a
reformed BAP, only a set of voluntary agreements or a
combination of the two. Informed decision-making about the
need for the BAP can only be made if a close watch is kept on
the operation of the voluntary agreements.

178

To aid in this effort, the SRD should be modified so that voluntary
payments are shown in a uniform way. As explained in Appendix C, the
current form does not allow all voluntary payments to be identified.
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C. IMPARTIAL AGENCY
6. AN

IMPARTIAL AGENCY SHOULD BE CREATED TO GIVE POOR

DEBTORS ADVICE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THEIR DEBT.

Currently, Canadian debtors have no place to turn for impartial
debt advice. Debtors can seek advice from credit counselling
services but these are either financed by creditors or are forprofit, fee-charging entities; most require 100 percent
179
repayment. Trustees are another possible source but they have
a clear incentive to recommend bankruptcy. The creation of a
neutral agency that provides advice on debtors’ rights vis-à-vis
their creditors and suggests the most appropriate remedy is
recommended. We recommend the creation of an impartial debt
advice agency in 2 to 3 pilot sites in the short term (Toronto,
Montreal and Vancouver).

179

The Office of Consumer Affairs recently published a study of credit
counseling which highlights the lack of regulation of that industry and its
potential bias.
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APPENDIX A
Description of Trustees Interviewed
Trustee 1
Trustee 1 works in Montreal in a mid-market, regional
Chartered Accountant and Consulting firm with offices in
Toronto and Montreal. She has recently moved offices and the
exact number of files and division of consumer/commercial files
is not yet available. The primary target market for the firm is
privately held companies ranging from $10 million in revenues
to complex organizations with annual revenues of $150 million.
Trustee 2
This trustee works in the Windsor area, administering
approximately 100 bankruptcy files per year. Ninety-five percent
of her business encompasses consumer bankruptcies.
Trustee 3
Trustee 3 is a sole practitioner in Edmonton, previously having
worked for large accounting firms and other sole practitioners.
She has a social work background. Trustee 3's practice is
composed entirely of consumer bankruptcies, administering
about 250 files per year. She has twenty years of experience in
the bankruptcy field.
Trustee 4
Trustee 4 is part of a mid-size accounting firm in Toronto where
he heads the insolvency division. He has been in practice since
the early 1980s, formerly with large accounting firms. He is a
specialist in both corporate and personal bankruptcy, providing
consulting services to both debtors and creditors.
Trustee 5
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Trustee 5 is a sole practitioner in London, Ontario. His firm
primarily administers consumer bankruptcies, with 95 per cent
of the business focusing on consumer files.
Trustee 6
Trustee 6 works in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in an office of four
trustees; he specializes in the areas of financial restructuring,
receivership, and bankruptcy. Trustee 6’s firm undertakes both
corporate and consumer bankruptcies, handling about 500
consumer bankruptcies each year.
Trustee 7
Trustee 7 works for a small firm with offices in Toronto,
Kingston, and Brockville. The business handles mostly
consumer files, approximately 400 per year. He has worked as a
trustee for 10 years.
Trustee 8
This trustee has worked six of her 11 years as a trustee in
private practice. She currently handles bankruptcy files in the
Greater Toronto Area, administering approximately 400
bankruptcies each year.
Trustee 9
This trustee works at a national firm in Ottawa.
Bankrupt
A female poor debtor (under our definition) who has been
through the bankruptcy system two times. The second time she
was assigned into bankruptcy it was under the BAP program.
She was referred to us by her BAP trustee.
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APPENDIX B
BIA, Rule 128(1)
Also, see OSB Circular 2, which was introduced in 1999 and
imposes the $10,000 maximum.
TRUSTEE’S FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS IN SUMMARY
ADMINISTRATION
128. (1) The fees of the trustee for services performed in a
summary administration are calculated on the total receipts
remaining after deducting necessary disbursements relating
directly to the realization of the property of the bankrupt, and
the payments to secured creditors, according to the following
percentages:
(a) 100 per cent on the first $975 or less of receipts;
(b) 35 per cent on the portion of the receipts exceeding $975
but not exceeding $2,000; and
(c) 50 per cent on the portion of the receipts exceeding $2,000.
(2) A trustee in a summary administration may claim, in
addition to the amount set out in subsection (1),
(a) the costs of counselling referred to in subsection 131(2);
(b) the fee for filing an assignment referred to in paragraph
132(a);
(c) the fee payable to the registrar under paragraph 1(a) of Part
II of the schedule;
(d) the amount of applicable federal and provincial taxes for
goods and services; and
(e) a lump sum of $100 in respect of administrative
disbursements.
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(3) A trustee in a summary administration may withdraw from
the bank account used in administering the estate of the
bankrupt, as an advance on the amount set out in subsection (1),
(a) $250, at the time of the mailing of the notice of
bankruptcy;
(b) an additional $250, thirty days after the date of the
bankruptcy; and
(c) an additional $250, four months after the date of the
bankruptcy.
(4) Subsections (1) to (3) apply to bankruptcies in respect of
which proceedings are commenced on or after September 30,
1997 and the accounts are taxed on or after April 30, 1998.
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APPENDIX C
The data analysis reported at several points in the text was
conducted by the Business Intelligence Centre (BIC) of the Office
of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB). The statistical
analysis of consumer bankruptcy was greatly eased by the
advent of electronic filing on January 1, 2002; most documents
related to consumer bankruptcies are now electronically
submitted and can be quickly and accurately analyzed.
Two factors determined our choice of a data file on which to
base our analysis. First, our analysis was concerned with trustee
fees and creditor dividends, so we needed a sample of
bankruptcies that had electronically-submitted Statements of
Receipts and Disbursements (SRD). The SRD shows all receipts
and disbursements arising from a consumer bankruptcy,
including trustee fees, voluntary payments by debtors and
dividends disbursed to the creditors. The trustee typically
submits the SRD to the OSB at least nine months after the
bankruptcy was filed, close to the date when the bankruptcy file
is closed. Second, most bankruptcies filed by poor debtors will
be summary administration cases so we wanted to limit the
analysis to such files.
These two factors led us to choose to analyze all summary
administration bankruptcies for which a Statement of Receipts
and Disbursement was electronically-submitted between
January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006. According to BIC, there
were 29,279 such bankruptcies available for analysis.
Note that these are not all summary administration
bankruptcies filed in calendar 2006. Because of the lag between
the filing of a bankruptcy and the submission of an SRD months
(and possibly years) later, many of the bankruptcies that we
analyze will have been filed in calendar 2005 (and, for a small
number, in 2004). Furthermore, we are looking only at SRDs
submitted electronically. Nonetheless, we do not expect that
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substantial bias is introduced by our use of electronicallysubmitted SRDs. Finally, not all of the bankruptcies in our
analytic file were closed in calendar 2006. After the trustee
submits the SRD, the OSB sends the trustee a letter of comment
approving the closing of the file. For that reason, not all
bankruptcies for which an SRD was received in calendar 2006
will have been closed in calendar 2006.
All of the statistical information in this paper was generated by
BIC using the 29,279 electronically-filed cases with SRDs. Many
variables, including the dividend paid to creditors and the level
of trustee fees, can be accurately derived from the electronicallyfiled cases. However, the value of voluntary payments made by
the debtor to the trustee must be estimated because trustees are
not required to report such payments in a consistent fashion.
Most trustees, however, report them by noting their existence in
the SRD. For example, a particular dollar amount in the receipt
portion of the SRD might be identified as “voluntary payment”
or “payment by debtor”. In some cases, however, voluntary
payments will have been made but there is no way to identify
them on the SRD.

